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Abstract—In Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) systems,
smart meters (SM) send fine-grained power consumption in-
formation to the utility company, yet this power consumption
information can uncover sensitive information about the con-
sumers’ lifestyle. To allow the utility company to gather the power
consumption information while safeguarding the consumers’ pri-
vacy, different methods that broadly utilize symmetric key and
asymmetric key cryptography operation have been generally
utilized. In this paper, we propose an effective method that uses
symmetric key cryptography and hashing operation to gather
power consumption information. Moreover, provide the utility
company with an overview of the type of the appliances used
by its power consumer and range of power use. The idea is based
on sending cover power consumption information from the smart
meters and removes these covers by including every one of the
smart meters’ messages, with the goal that the utility can take
in the accumulated power consumption information, yet cannot
take in the individual readings. Our assessments show that the
cryptographic operations required in our scheme are substantially
more effective than the operations required in other schemes.
Keywords: Privacy, Security, AMI Networks, Demand Re-
sponse, Smart Meter, and Smart Grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid utilizes smart devices that have communica-
tion and also calculation capacities to update the current power
grid. This new update intends to utilize power more produc-
tively, diminish the CO2 emissions, and integrate sustainable
power source assets. One of the important applications in the
smart grid that is as of now being actualized is the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [1].
The AMI systems have smart meters placed on the customer
side to associate the consumers with the service provider (utility
company). The smart meters send fine-grained power consump-
tion information to the utility company to screen the power
requests over brief periods. The frequent of the information
transmission can be as little as a couple of minutes. However,
the fine-grained power consumption information being gathered
can be utilized to explain the exercises and behavior of the
consumer [2], [3]. It can uncover the kinds of exercises going
ahead in the house like the appliances that are right now
utilized, regardless of whether a consumer is voyaging, when
consumer out of the home and when they return back, and so
on. Clearly, uncovering such sensitive information is a risk to
the privacy protection of the consumers, in the long run, this
privacy problem may make them quit from demand response
and AMI systems [4], [5].
To address this privacy issue, a few ideas have been proposed
as of late to empower the utility company to gather the fine-
grained power consumption information while protecting the
consumers’ privacy and security [6]–[9]. The vast majority of
these schemes either widely utilize asymmetric key cryptogra-
phy operation, for example, homomorphic encryption strategies
or depend on control batteries to conceal the real power
utilization. Nevertheless, these strategies are expensive as far
as equipment or communication and computation. Specifically,
due to utilizing symmetric key cryptography in the gathering
of readings, ciphertext size is vast and calculation time is long
in light of the fact that they require costly calculations.
In this paper, we propose an effective method that for the
most part utilizes lightweight symmetric key cryptography and
hashing operations to gather power consumption information
while safeguarding consumer’s privacy. The thought depends
on sending conceal power consumption information in a vector
manner by the smart meters and expelling these covers by
aggregating every one of the smart meters’ messages, with
the goal that the utility company can take in the accumu-
lated reading, however, the utility company cannot learn the
individual power consumption information. Each smart meter
shares secret cover values with the utility company. The smart
meter covers its power consumption information with the shared
secret cover values with the utility company. Keeping in mind
the end goal is to remove the covers by the utility company and
extracting the accumulated information form every one of the
smart meters. Every intermediary smart meter adds to its power
consumption information the shared secret cover value with
the utility company. To get the aggregated power consumption
information by the utility company, all the shared secret cover
values shared with all smart meters must be subtracted from the
covered aggregated power consumption information received
by the utility company. So, to process the collected power
consumption information without knowing the smart meters’
individual power consumption information, all the smart meters
information should be added.
In our scheme, each smart meter should share a symmetric
key with the utility company to secure the communications.
To allow the smart meter and utility company to process
an alternate secret cover value for each power consumption
information reporting, they should share a symmetric key and
utilize it to calculate the shared secret cover value. Proficient
hashing operations can be utilized to calculate the shared secret
cover value. We additionally present a key management system
that utilizations asymmetric key operation, yet dissimilar to
the power consumption information gathering that is done
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Fig. 1: Tree topology network in (Multi-hop) AMI network.
oftentimes, the key management system is run each prolonged
range of time for key reestablishments.
Our calculations show that the cryptographic operations
required in our scheme are substantially more effective than
the operation required in the present schemes. Our investi-
gation demonstrates that the proposed scheme can safeguard
the consumers’ privacy and give high-security level against
collusion attacks. Moreover, there is an intriguing tradeoff
between privacy level protection and system overhead. Utilizing
more privacy level protection increments the overhead in size
of the shared keys and covers, however, it can give more
insurance against attackers. We have additionally directed ex-
perimentation on MatLab to evaluate our scheme and calculate
the overhead of the system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
Network and Adversary Models are described in Section II. The
Load Control and Privacy-Preserving Scheme explained is in
Section III. The results are explained in Section IV. Conclusions
is drawn in Section V.
II. NETWORK AND ADVERSARY MODELS
In this section, we describe the network and adversary model.
We explain how each entity is connected in the network model
and what is the aim of the attacker in the adversary model.
A. Network Model
The system network model consists of smart meters (SMs),
Gateway, and utility company [1], [10]. The SMs are linked to
each other and to the Gateway utilizing short-range connection
protocol like Wi-Fi, ZigBee or 6LoWPAN, as shown in Fig. 1.
Smart meters cannot be linked straight to the Utility company,
however, the Gateway falls in as a hand-off between the smart
meters and the Utility company. Each smart meter operates
as a switch to hand-off smart meters’ packets to link them
to the Gateway. The Gateway gathers all smart meters power
consumption information and sends an accumulated power
consumption information to the Utility company through a
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Fig. 2: Adversary Model, Compromised SM and Eavesdropper.
long-range connection, for example, 4G, LTE, or fiber optic
links. This power consumption information transmission rate
can be less than a minute for a commercial building and more
than a minute for household building [11].
B. Adversary Model
We examine fair-but-curious adversary model. The attacker is
interested in learning private data on the power consumers yet
the attacker would prefer not to bother the communication or
the appropriate operation of the system network. We consider
a strong attacker model by expecting that attacker can be
both interior and/or exterior and can be all smart meters, as
shown in Fig. 2. The exterior attacker can observe the trans-
missions messages and the interior attacker can compromise
other smart meters to take in the secret cover values they
include for covering their power consumption information. For
cooperation attack(i. e., collusion attack), we expect that any
number of interior and/or exterior compromised smart meters
can cooperate, however, this cooperation can be at most n-1
smart meters, where the Utility company has n smart meters.
The objective of the attacker is to figure out how many smart
home appliances are there in the community, how much power
they are consuming from the grid and in which level they are.
III. LOAD CONTROL AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEME
The scheme is described in this section. We start with an
overview of the scheme, then the system setup, after that
we explain how the key management is working followed by
the power consumption vector generation and finally the load
control by the utility company.
A. Overview
Each smart meter SMi shares a symmetric key with the
Utility company. These keys are utilized to calculate the secret
cover value to cover the power consumption information send
by the smart meters, as shown in Fig. 3. Each smart meter cov-
ers its power consumption information for the privacy issue, and
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Fig. 3: Key Agreement Topology, Each SM share a Symmetric Key
with the Utility Company.
the secret cover value subtracted by the Utility company from
the accumulated power consumption information to get the total
power consumption information reading without knowing the
individual readings.
In this section, we initially disclose the required cryptogra-
phy to bootstrap our scheme system. Then, we interpret the
way of including/expelling secret cover value and explain the
information accumulation scheme in our systems. At last, we
interpret a productive and secure key management strategy.
B. System Setup
A trusted authority (TA) generates a finite field Z∗q of order
q, where q is a large prime number. G1 is additive group and P
is the generator of the group G1. Ek() and Dk() are symmetric-
key encryption and decryption operations, where k is the secret
shared key.
There is one one-way hash functions H1, where H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1. For each smart meter SMi, the TA picks a
random element ski ∈ Z∗q and calculates PKi = skiP , where
ski and PKi are the smart meters secret and public keys,
respectively.
Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem [12], [13] also has been
utilized in our scheme for power consumption accumulation in
a privacy-preserving way. Homomorphic encryption is a sort
of public key encryption in which multiplying two encrypted
messages (while in cypher domain) results in the summation
of the messages (in plaintext domain). The Utility company
produces homomorphic public key (N , G) and private key (λ)
Homomrphic encryption = GmζNmod N2
The TA distributes the public parameters of the system
{q, P,H1, Ek(), Dk(), N, and G}.
C. Key agreement procedure
The key agreement procedure should be executed in one of
the following cases:
• At the bootstrap of the system;
Utility CompanySMi
IDi, ki,uP, TSi, σi
IDu, ku,iP, TSu, H1(Ku,i||1), σu
H1(Ki,u||2)
Fig. 4: Key Agreement steps between SM and the Utility Company.
• When a new smart meter is added/removed to/from the
AMI networks;
• In key renewals;
Each smart meter SMi needs to share a symmetric key with
the Utility company. As explained earlier, the symmetric keys
are used to calculate secretly shared cover value. Although
symmetric keys are usually used for a longer time intervals,
key renewal is a good practice to thwart cryptanalysis attacks.
As shown in Fig. 3, to share a long-term secret symmetric key
with the Utility company, each smart meter SMi chooses a ran-
dom element ki,u ∈ Z∗q and forms a key establishment request
packet. As shown in Fig. 4, the packet has IDi, ki,uP, TSi
and σi, where, IDi is the identifier of SMi, TSi is the current
timestamp, ki,uP is the random element (ki,u multiplied by the
group generator P of the additive group G1), and σi is signature
of SMi. The smart meter then sends the key generation request
packet to the Utility company.
The Utility company checks that the packet is not old
by examining the timestamp TSi to prevent replay attacks.
Then, the Utility company checks the signature σi on the
information it has received to prevent man-in-the-middle at-
tacks. Then, the Utility company chooses a random element
ku,i ∈ Z∗q and calculates ku,iP . The Utility company cal-
culates the long-term shared seed key Ku,i to be equal to
(ku,iki,uP ). Finally, the Utility company sends the key estab-
lishment reply packet to SMi. As shown in Fig. 4, the packet
has IDu, ku,iP, TSu, H2(Ku,i||1), and σu, where, IDu is the
identifier of the Utility company, TSu is the current timestamp,
ku,iP is the random element (ku,i multiplied by the group
generator P ), and σu is the signature on the packet. H2(Ki,u||1)
is used for key confirmation. When SMi receives the packet,
it checks the timestamp and the signature similar to that of
the Utility company. Then, the smart meter SMi computes
the long-term shared key Ku,i to be equal to (ki,uku,iP ). The
derived keys by SMi and the Utility company are identical
Ki,u = Ku,i = ki,uku,iP = ku,iki,uP
F0= H1(Ki,u||IDi)
F1= H1(F0)
F2= H1(F1)
F3= H1(F2)
Fn-1= H1(Fn-2)
Fn= H1(Fn-1)
.
.
.
B1= H1(B0)
B0= H1(Ki,u||IDu)
B2= H1(B1)
B3= H1(B2)
Bn= H1(Bn-1)
Bn-1= H1(Bn-2)
.
.
.
K0,i,u = H1(F0Bn)
K1,i,u = H1(F1Bn-1)
K2,i,u = H1(F2Bn-2)
Kn-3,i,u = H1(Fn-2B2)
Kn-1,i,u = H1(Fn-1B1)
Kn,i,u = H1(FnB0)
.
.
.
Forward Hash-Chain Backward Hash-Chain Session Keys
Fig. 5: Key Session generation steps at each elemnets in the AMI
network.
Next, the smart meter SMi and the Utility company derive the
session keys for each communication session.
The Ki,u is the seed for the session keys. The smart meter
SMi and the Utility company use the seed to calculate a
forward hash chain by using hash function H1 on the seed
key Ki,u. As shown in Fig. 5, the smart meter SMi and
Utility company calculate F0 by hashing H1(Ki,u||IDi), then
calculate F1 by hashing H1(F0) for t time. The last Ft is equal
to H1(Ft−1). To improve security, each key is only used for
one communication session, and thus t gives the number of the
communication session messages that will be used in the long-
term interval. Then, the smart meter SMi calculates a backward
hash chain for the same key Ki,u just like above. As shown in
Fig. 5, the smart meter SMi and the Utility company calculate
B0 by hashing H1(Ki,u||IDu), then calculate B1 by hashing
H1(B0) for t time. The last Bt will be equal to H1(Bt−1).
Finally, the smart meter SMi and the Utility company use the
hash function H1 and XOR operation to calculate the session
keys. As illustrated in Fig. 5, every key has two parts; one
comes from the first forward hash chain and the other comes
from the second backward hash chain. For example, K0,i,u has
two parts F0 and Bt that are XORed. The first part comes
from the beginning of the first hash chain F0 and the second
part comes from the end of the second hash chain Bt. The SMi
and the Utility company use the session keys to generate the
same covered values. After using all keys, they calculate a new
long-term key Ki,u and derive new session keys.
D. Power Consumption Vector Generation
Every smart meter SMi should make its power consumption
vector that has the measure of energy consumed by each
appliance. The organization of the vector is given in Fig. 6. We
divide the appliances in the home into two type, controllable
and uncontrollable. The controllable device such as (Water
heater, Dryer, Electrical car charging, and Heating, ventila-
tion, and air conditioning (HVAC)) can be controlled by the
Utility company for total load managing. The uncontrollable
appliances are the rest of devices inside the home which the
utility company cannot control it. The vector divided into five
groups, each group represent an appliance in the home. Each
appliance represents by three group of bits. The first group
000   00000000 000   00000000   000   00000000
000   00000000   000   00000000   000   00000000
000   00000000   000   00000000   000   00000000
000   00000000   000   00000000   000   00000000
000   00000000
Appliance Type
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
ON/OFF
Power
consumption
Water heater
Dryer
EV charging
HVAC
Rest Appliances
Vector Preparation
000   00000000   001 00000025   000   00000000
000   00000000   000   00000000   000   00000000
001 00000012 000   00000000   000   00000000
000   00000000   000   00000000   001 00000035
001 00000125
Example: Water Heater and HVAC are ON, also EV is charging.
Fig. 6: Power consumption vector generation in our scheme.
for low power consumption, the second for medium power
consumption and finally the third for high power consumption.
These three groups are divided into two subgroups. The first
part of the group of bits is for the number of appliances ON
in the community, the second is for the amount of power
consumed by these appliances.
When a controllable appliance is ON, the smart meter first
checks the level of the appliance that it is working in, is it in
low, medium or high level. Then the smart meter according to
the level of appliance’s operation puts one in the number field
and the amount of power consumption in the consuming field,
as shown in Fig. 6. The smart meter does the above operation
for all appliances. In case the appliance is OFF, the smart meter
puts zero in all fields of that appliance. For uncontrollable
appliances, the smart meter put one in the number field for
the last group of bits then aggregate all the appliances reading
and put the aggregated reading in the consumption field.
An example is shown in Fig. 6, the bottom part of the figure
illustrate that some appliances are ON inside the home and
some of them are OFF. The Water heater is ON, it is consuming
25 power unit and in the medium level power consumption.
Moreover, the Dryer is OFF, the Electrical Vehicle is charging,
it is consuming 12 power unit in low power consumption level.
The HVAC is working in the high power consumption level
and it is consuming 35 power units. The rest of the house’s
appliances are consuming 125 power unit.
E. Aggregating the power consumption reading and recovering
the total reading from the covered messages
Fig. 7 describes a case on how the Utility company recovers
the accumulated SMs’ power consumption without knowing the
individual power consumption readings. For clearness purpose,
we presume that the AMI system has just three smart meters,
however, the concept can be stretched to more smart meters
in the community. We presume that the smart meter SMi
has already a shared secret symmetric key with the Utility
company. As shown in the Fig. 7, each smart meter’s message
has a covered value that is the shared secret symmetric key
with the Utility company Ki,u that has been added to the
power consumption reading ri vector and the result has been
multiplied by the generator of the additive group P . For
instance, SM1 send its power consumption covered reading
m1 to its parent smart meter SM3. The power consumption
covered reading consist of the actual reading and the shared
symmetric key with the Utility company (m1 = (r1 + k1)P ).
After SM3 gets the messages of its children smart meters (SM1
and SM2), it adds the messages m1 and m2 to its own power
consumption information m3.
Given these two messages (m1 and m2), it is not feasible
to recover the readings of SM1 and SM2 because SM3 does
not know the shared secret symmetric key with the Utility
company Ki,u that are added by smart meters. SM3 aggregates
the messages of SM1 and SM2 with its own covered reading to
calculate M3, where M3 = m1+m2+m3 = (Σri+Σki)P . The
scheme utilizes in-network accumulation, where the message
sent by each smart meter has the power consumption of all its
children smart meters. Finally, the SM3 sends M3 to the Utility
company that removes the covers to obtain the aggregated
reading Σ3i=1ri.
So, in general the Utility company removes the covers by
subtracting all the shared secret symmetric key with all the
smart meters in one batch operation. The Utility company adds
all the shared secret symmetric key to calculate Σni=1K0,i,uP ,
then the Utility company subtracts this value from the accu-
mulated power consumption that has been received from the
Gateway
Mu−Σni=1K0,i,u = −Σni=1K0,i,u + Σni=1K0,i,u + Σni=1riP
The Utility company can get the accumulated power con-
sumption information from each community and the total is
Σni=1ri, where n is the number of the smart meters in that
community. All the messages should have hash values and
timestamps to ensure message integrity and freshness.
F. Load Control by Utility company
After the Utility company gets the accumulated power con-
sumption information from the community which is Σni=1ri.
Then the Utility company checks the Σni=1ri vector to get an
understanding of the numbers of the appliances that is power
ON in the community and the level of their work. In case
the Utility company needs power reduction in any community
due to overload or the Utility company has maintenance on
one or more of its power generators, the Utility company
replay the community through the gateway with a message and
ask for a reduction in the controllable appliances. The Utility
company asks the smart meters that have the appliances that
are working at the high-level to reduce power consumption
more than the appliances that are at the medium-level. If the
power reduction in the medium and high-level is sufficient for
the Utility company, then the Utility company does not ask
low-level power consumption to reduce any power. By dividing
the appliances into controllable and uncontrollable, the Utility
SM1
Gateway
Utility Company
SM2
SM3
m1 = (r1 + k1)P
m2 = (r2 + k2)P
m3 = (r3 + k3)P
M3 = m1 + m2 + m3
M3 = (r1 + r2 + r3) + (k1+ k2+ k3)P
M3 = (Σri + Σki)P
m1 m2
M3
M3
m3
Mu = M3 – ΣkiP
Mu = ΣriP + ΣkiP – ΣkiP
Mu = ΣriP
Fig. 7: Aggregate Reading from SM to Utility company and Utility
company retrieve the total reading (Mu).
company can easily balance the load between generation and
demand. Also, by dividing each appliance into three level of
operation we can ensure a fair reduction in power, the Utility
company asks the high-level appliances to reduce more than
the appliances that are in the medium-level and may not ask
the appliances in the low-level to decrease any of their power
consumption.
IV. RESULTS
In this paper, we address the privacy issue in the AMI
network. We divide home appliances into two categories,
controllable and unconrtollable. The controllable that can be
controlled by the Utility company and the Utility company can
know the number of specific appliances is ON in a community,
the amount of power consumption by these appliances and the
range of their working.
We choose point addition and homomorphic for adding the
vectors of the consumer (SMi). As shown in Fig. 8c, the
homomorphic encryption need more time than that needed
by point addition for the same network and topology. As the
homomorphic messages are longer and time for encryption and
decryption need by homomorphic encryption is much more
compared to the point addition, homomorphic encryption time
for completion increase linearly with the increase of the number
of the smart meters in the AMI network. For the point addition,
the trend is almost constant and the increment of the number
of the smart meters in the AMI network will not affect the time
to completion.
There is a trade-off between increasing the number of
the smart meters in the AMI network and the overhead in
the computation. When the network is very big the time to
completion will increase with the homomorphic encryption,
as shown in Fig. 8c, but time for decryption stay the same
as we need one decryption for the accumulated message. on
the other hand, increasing the number of the smart meters
in the AMI network using addition point does not increase
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Fig. 8: Performance comparison among Homomorphic and Point Addition
in the completion time but retrieving the message from the
accumulated message (Σni=1riP) will increase. So, for a small
network, the point addition gives a good result as need less time
for converging and less time for retrieving the data. but for a
big network, the homomorphic encryption gives a better result.
The homomorphic encryption needs more time for converging
but retrieving the data is a one decryption operation.
We test our scheme (point addition and homomorphic en-
cryption) on a tree topology as it is most common topology.
We choose a binary tree that each smart meter has two children
and also on Tri-tree where the smart meter has three children.
As shown in Figs. 8a and 8b, both operation (point addtion and
homomorphic encyption) has almost the same performance on
the two topology. But the performance change with changing
the encryption method (point addition and homomorphic) as
shown in Fig. 8c.
After the Utility company gets the accumulated message, the
Utility company decrypt the message and from the result, the
Utility company knows the number of appliances (controllable)
that are ON in the community and the Utility company know the
power consumption per appliance. This result helps the Utility
company to ask for the reduction in power consumption without
knowing the individual reading.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed an effective scheme to empower the Utility
company to gather the power consumption information while
saving the consumers’ privacy. Our scheme generally utilizes
lightweight symmetric key cryptography and hashing operations
to gather power consumption information. The asymmetric key
cryptography operation is required just for the key management
that is executed each lengthy time-frame. Our estimations
have demonstrated that our scheme can decrease the package
measure, as well as lessen the calculation time at each smart
meter. We utilized MatLab system to evaluate the effect of this
overhead decrease on the system execution. The simulation has
exhibited that our scheme expends considerably less transmis-
sion capacity, has less package transmission, and less delay. Our
investigation has shown that the proposed scheme is secure and
can save consumers’ privacy.
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